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Violations of published strictures on password use have led 
to widespread unauthorized access to computer systems. The 
problem may compound as inexpert users, handicapped by 
inadequate guidance and ignorance of computers, are increas- 
ingly involved on networked, supposedly “ user-friendly” work- 
stations. The literature on password methods reflects a tech- 
nocentric focus emphasizing security without due regard for 
user comfort, i.e., a “user-hostile”, system perspective. We 
present a “ user-friendly” model for the password selection and 
re-creation processes rooted in cognitive psychology. The model 
suggests two approaches to password selection - one rooted in 
a nomothetic, or particularized, the other in an idiographic, or 
generalized, treatment of experience - that exploit principles of 
recall, memory aids and simple formal transformations. A third 
approach, exploiting environmental cues - hence recognition 
rather than recall - is also considered. Intermediate approaches 
enable tradeoffs between password security and memorability 
appropriate to the context and cognitive style of the user. The 
reduction of the approaches to practice is illustrated in numer- 
ous examples. The approaches yield passwords more vulnerable 
to discovery than those envisioned in system-oriented theory, 
yet operationally superior to many prompted by strictures 
reflecting a technocentric system perspective. We recommend 
that guidance materials on password use be made available on 
systems. 
Keywords: Keywords: passwords, user authentication, user- 
friendly, cognitive psychology, human-memory model 
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1. Introduction 
Two recent phenomena suggest the value of a new 
look at password methods of controlling access to 
computer systems. First, the widely publicized 
escapades of the Milwaukee-based “414’s” and 
others dramatize the ease of unauthorized access 
to many computer systems based on password 
compromises. For example, testifying recently be- 
fore a House subcommittee, seventeen-year-old 
Neal Patrick claimed that he simply “kept trying 
passwords until one worked” [l]. Password com- 
promises have resulted from information on com- 
puter bulletin boards, from guesses based on per- 
sonal vitae and environmental cues, and from sys- 
tematic trials. Incredibly, many intruders - includ- 
ing Neal Patrick - have simply exploited knowl- 
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edge of obvious passwords (e.g., “test” and “sys- 
tem”) in common use among field personnel of 
computer manufacturers. Thus, even some com- 
puter professionals have used deficient passwords. 
We may well be apprehensive, then, over a 
second recent phenomenon, the dramatic increase 
in the number of novices using computers, for 
novices may be especially prone to use deficient 
passwords due to their limited understanding of 
computers. Their use of computers has been fos- 
tered through the development of so-called “user- 
friendly” workstations - workstations now being 
“networked”, or interconnected, along with central 
equipment to facilitate information-sharing and 
communication. Still, considerations of personal 
privacy, proprietary interests and administrative 
confidentiality dictate control of information 
access - we thus exclude direct consideration here 
of measures addressing national security - and the 
problems of controlling access are compounding, 
as systems become increasingly distributed and as 
inexpert users are involved in ever greater num- 
bers. 
The nature of these problems is exposed by 
examining the literature on password methods of 
controlling access, and its relation to practice. 
Most current methods of controlling system access 
involve user selection of passwords; yet the litera- 
ture provides the computer novice - or the expert, 
for that matter - with few guides for password 
selection [2]. Rather, contributions have often fea- 
tured lists of ad hoc “do? and “don’ts” focussing 
on security [3]. The lists of “dos” generally recom- 
mend passwords that are long, composed of ran- 
dom characters, and frequently changed. The 
“don’t” lists usually reject the use of names, ini- 
tials, dates and numbers prominent in the user’s 
life, in particular, and of words, in general. They 
often forbid the use of reverse transcriptions of 
these items as well as environmental cues. They 
also counsel against keeping records of passwords 
in card decks, computer files or work areas as well 
as on one’s person. In practice, however, these 
strictures are largely ignored: Parker observes, for 
example, that most users select as passwords 
names, initials, dates or numbers prominent in 
their lives, or their reverse transcriptions [4]. More- 
over, much of the formal theory in password liter- 
ature fails to accord with common practice. In 
particular, combinatorial analyses pertaining to 
random character strings, though a popular topic, 
have little relevance to most current passwords as 
characterized above. 
That users generally ignore published strictures 
on password selection is hardly surprising, since 
they cannot be reconciled with the “ user-friendly” 
basis of system operation now widely sought. The 
traditional emphasis on system security at the 
expense of password memorability reflects a tech- 
nocentric, “ user-hostile” perspective. Thus, the 
literature gives short shrift to the user’s problems 
of selecting passwords that can be reliably recalled 
and of coping with serious information overload - 
problems compounded with suggested password 
methods. For example, it fails to recognize that the 
use of transistory passwords without transcription 
represents a departure from common experience, 
for people routinely use cards to store even rela- 
tivelypermanent personal information of compara- 
ble complexity and sensitivity, including social- 
security, driver’s license, credit-account and bank- 
account numbers [5]. 
The disparity between published wisdom and 
practice indicates a broad need for suggestions on 
methods of selecting relatively secure passwords 
that are acceptable to users. A spectrum of unre- 
solved user problems should be confronted. Criti- 
cal questions include: Are there effective general 
methods of password use “friendly” to novice 
users? [6] Can such methods provide for rein- 
forcing memory of selected passwords, for com- 
batting interference from mental “clutter” such as 
discarded passwords? In this article, we consider 
how password methods can be made more con- 
sistent with the over-arching goal of “ user-frien- 
dliness” for systems. First, we develop a “user- 
friendly” model for the password selection and 
recreation processes. Subsequently, we discuss 
password methods especially adapted to the needs 
of inexpert users. In particular, we recommend 
some simple methods of selecting passwords that 
are easily recalled but not easily discovered. We 
then consider how systems can ease the user’s 
plight. 
2. A Model for the Password-Selection Process 
Password methods of controlling system access 
would be facilitated by a “user-friendly” process 
of password selection, that is, a process yielding 
passwords visible to the user, yet invisible to others. 
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In effect, then, memorability and security of pass- 
words should both be made critical issues. Further, 
a model of the process should accommodate the 
need for a typical user to select a sequence of 
passwords. Such a requirement is likely for several 
reasons. First, users should anticipate sudden pass- 
word changes warranted by possible compromise, 
as when keyboard scrutiny may have occurred 
during password entry. Second, routine changes of 
password are desirable to end any undetected in- 
trusions. Third, a user may need, or elect, to have 
several accounts with different passwords, particu- 
larly since partitioning of information among 
several accounts with different passwords can limit 
the implications of a password compromise. 
A model of the selection process for passwords 
clearly ought to accommodate also to the process 
for their re-creation. In the absence of direct en- 
vironmental cues, a case considered subsequently, 
re-creation of a previously selected password in- 
volves recall, or appeal to long-term memory 
(LTM). The representation of LTM in terms of 
so-called “semantic” and “episodic” memories - a 
distinction more or less accepted by cognitive psy- 
chologists - has great utility for a model of the 
password re-creation process [7]. Semantic mem- 
ory is deemed to hold information closely tied to 
language use, including models, whereas episodic 
memory is thought to store information more di- 
rectly descriptive of individual experience. 
Semantic memory provides rapid access to infor- 
mation stripped of contextual details, while epi- 
sodic memory provides slower access to informa- 
tion on contextualizing details, e.g., on temporal 
and spatial relations among events. Semantic 
memory is, then, largely a repository of widely 
shared information, whereas episodic memory is a 
store of information that is largely unshared, being 
so closely tied to personal experience. Thus, in 
relation to passwords, recourse to semantic mem- 
ory implies use of information framed in a broad 
social context that favors recall, but also appre- 
hension by others. On the other hand, recourse to 
episodic memory implies use of information framed 
in a limited personal context that may suffice to 
ensure recall but does limit risk of apprehension by 
most others. To enhance password security, the 
appeal should be made as nearly as possible to 
episodic memory. However, the issues of recalla- 
bility and the user’s preferred cognitive style will 
dictate compromises of varying degree [8]. 
The use of environmental cues to foster pass- 
word re-creation is itself “ user-friendly”, since 
humans find recognition easier than recall; indeed, 
such cues can reduce the degree of dependence on 
information in LTM [9]. In fact, such cues are so 
“ user-friendly” - especially for users with recall 
problems, or in controlled areas - that they cannot 
be lightly dismissed. However, since the user clearly 
risks that information drawn from the environ- 
ment will be apprehended by a prospective in- 
truder more or less aware of the same environ- 
ment, environmental cueing of passwords is viable 
only if done discreetly. 
Whatever the source of information, a model 
for the password-selection process should also 
accommodate “ user-friendly” methods for meet- 
ing security requirements. For this purpose, users 
need congenial ways of transforming information 
to produce passwords distanced enough in form 
from ordinary experience to make discovery un- 
likely. Congeniality implies that the transforma- 
tion process is easy both to remember and to 
execute. Happily, semantic memory functions as a 
rich storehouse of formal, model-related trans- 
forms employed continuously in mediating experi- 
ence. Such transforms, and their use, are subjects 
of subsequent sections of this presentation. 
Last, a model of the password-selection process 
should also account for the user’s physical context. 
For users in public areas, even keyboard character- 
istics must be considered: For example, the use of 
characters requiring an unusual reach for entry, 
e.g., the numerals, risks their apprehension through 
visual monitoring. At the other extreme, the exclu- 
sive use of characters demanding little reach, e.g., 
the “home” keys, risks apprehension of different, 
also potentially useful, information. Similarly, the 
number of password characters may well be dis- 
cerned through monitoring of audible “clicks” - 
clicks that, ironically, are often made to accom- 
pany actuations on noiseless keyboards as a service 
to the user [lo]. The use of relatively long pass- 
words - say, of six to twelve characters - reduces 
the risk that such specific information will lead to 
password compromise [ll]. For users in private 
quarters, e.g, home-based telecommuters, direct 
dependence on environmental cues may be ap- 
propriate. 
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3. User-Friendly Approaches to Password Selection Table 1 
Illustrative sequence of passwords associated with the lines of a 
chosen childhood verse. The cognitive model for password use just de- 
scribed suggests three general “ user-friendly” ap- 
proaches to password selection. The first approach 
trades initially on information stored largely in 
semantic memory, the second on information 
stored in episodic memory, and the third on infor- 
mation prompted by the environment. In each 
approach, the initial information is then trans- 
formed to produce passwords distanced enough in 
form from ordinary experience to resist discovery. 
Verse Line I Password 
One for the money 
Two for the show 
Three to get ready 





Adopting the first approach, the user initially 
appeals to semantic memory by choosing a well- 
known set of character strings as a basis for pro- 
ducing a sequence of passwords. Two general 
principles can profitably guide the choices. First, 
the user should choose character strings - provi- 
sionally, as developed later - that are widely 
shared, in the interest of recallability [12]. The 
strings, however, should not strongly reflect the 
user’s public life: That is, they should not strongly 
reflect such user characteristics as age, sex, ethnic- 
ity, geographical origin, social class, occupational 
role, group membership or personal attitudes [13]. 
Second, the user should have demonstrated a strong 
capacity, even a predilection, to recall the character 
strings and may well elect to heighten their recalla- 
bility using methods suggested later. The number 
of suitable strings available is far greater than 
might first appear. Each of us involuntarily re- 
tains, for example, a vast store of marginally func- 
tional trivia that persist in semantic memory but 
that are not likely to be closely associated with us 
by others. Possible choices include: aphorisms; 
titles, lines, or names from movie or television 
scripts; titles or segments of lyrics, poems and 
other literature; tunes; quotations; childhood 
verses; advertising jingles; recipes; names, num- 
bers or expressions related to historical and cur- 
rent events; descriptors related to recreational ac- 
tivities, furnishings, apparel, etc. 
The second step of the suggested approach 
involves processing of the chosen character strings, 
using information also stored largely in semantic 
memory, to produce passwords distanced in form 
from ordinary experience. One such approach ex- 
ploits memory-based models to transform the 
strings at some level, e.g., character, phoneme, 
syllable, word, phrase, clause, or sentence. Several 
principles can profitably guide the choice of a 
transform procedure. First, the procedure should 
be congenial for the user, i.e., easy both to remem- 
ber and to execute. Second, it should yield pass- 
words with structural details facilitating re-crea- 
tion, hence error discovery and control of inter- 
password interference. Third, it should yield pass- 
words that resist discovery based on informed 
guesses or systematic trials. Consider the following 
two examples of the proposed approach. 
Example I. Table 1 summarizes steps in producing 
a set of passwords closely related to a childhood 
verse. The verse selected is easily recalled, yet 
distanced from a given professional - and perhaps 
known personal - situation. The use of numeric 
representations of the first word, and of homo- 
Table 2 
Summary of relations among chosen names of cities, intermediate expressions and selected passwords. 
City 
1. Paris 
I Intermediate Expression 1 Password 
I Love Paris in the Springtime 1 ILPITST 
2. Rome Three (Bright) Coins in the (Trevi) Fountain TBCITTF 
3. New York The Sidewalks of New York (City) TSWONYC 
4. San Francisco I Left My Heart In San Francisco ILMHISF 
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phones of the second word, in each verse line leads 
to passwords combining numeric and alphabetic 
characters in a shared pattern, as a memory aid. 
Dropping dispensable words in the first three lines 
helps produce passwords of convenient length. 
Transliterations of the last word of two verse lines 
are used in passwords, and the last password has 
been extended rather arbitrarily using a congenial 
alliteration. The patterns of the passwords, espe- 
cially their sequential initial numerics, may help 
avoid confusion during, say, their concurrent use 
on different accounts. The strong underlying rela- 
tion among the passwords may warrant reserving 
them for non-critical uses. 
Example 2. Table 2 illustrates steps in the produc- 
tion of passwords tied to a list of “favorite cities” 
easily recalled by its author, who is concerned that 
his use of the list information might be antic- 
ipated, e.g., based on his resume. He therefore 
masks his use of the list by first choosing con- 
genial expressions closely associated by him with 
list elements. In this process, he interpolates the 
words in parentheses in popular song titles; as a 
result, passwords formed from the initial char- 
acters of words - including both components of 
compound words - each contain seven characters. 
This pre-planned structural detail serves as a con- 
venient check at password re-creation. The results 
are ill-suited to pronunciation as “words”, hence 
to acoustic coding at that level. Nevertheless, the 
passwords are easily re-created by their inventor 
and reasonably “safe” from discovery. (Two pass- 
word options, the choice of case for letters and the 
use of non-alphanumeric characters, are neglected 
in our initial examples but considered subse- 
quently.) 
Both examples illustrate a judicious initial ap- 
peal to shared information that is demonstrably 
recallable in full and immutable detail. In a second 
step, formal transformations lead to passwords 
distanced enough in form from ordinary experi- 
ence to achieve reasonable security. The transfor- 
mations chosen are easy both to remember and to 
execute, i.e., the passwords are easily re-created 
from the expressions; if the sets of passwords are 
considered in isolation, however, only those of 
Example 1 exhibit intrinsic properties fostering 
chooses a set of character strings through an ap- 
peal to episodic memory. Thus, he chooses a set of 
character strings reflecting an idiographic view of 
experience, i.e., he appeals to private, personal 
experience. Representative topics of such strings 
include notable but private episodes in the remote 
past, personal fantasies, voting patterns, intimate 
personal habits, details of private living quarters, 
and unspoken opinions or impressions. The 
method is illustrated in Example 3: 
Example 3. Table 3 relates passwords to a list of 
foods once distasteful to the user, in the aftermath 
of childhood overindulgences. The expressions are 
placed in chronological order of events to facilitate 
list reconstruction. Each password designedly in- 
corporates the three initial letters of three key 
words, including both components of “eggplant” 
(but not of “peanuts”, “pineapple” and 
“coconut”), hence contains nine characters. To 
foster recall, the user may exploit both the vivid 
images associated with these passwords and their 
relative “pronounceability”. To heighten security, 
the passwords of Table 3 may serve as inter- 
mediate expressions that are themselves trans- 
formed, e.g., using methods described later. 
The information imputed here to episodic mem- 
ory differs greatly from that in semantic memory 
(and in our earlier examples): The former is ordin- 
arily personal and private, the latter widely shared, 
even public. Of course, most information is shared 
in degree, and our examples only approach the 
two extremes. 
In a third approach, password selection can be 
based on a judicious appeal to environmental cues; 
for this purpose, adjectival, adverbial and similar 
Table 3 
Relations among foods disliked during childhood and selected 
passwords. 
their re-creation. 
Adopting a second approach, the user initially 
fried (-) eggplant FRIEGGPLA 
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expressions are generally preferable, from a secur- 
ity standpoint, to substantive expressions. Assume, 
for example, that a user in a public area is con- 
cerned about exposing password characters that 
require unusual reaches for keyboard entry. That 
user might base passwords on the expressions “re- 
achable”, “accessible”, and “attainable”, adjec- 
tives that both characterize and satisfy the require- 
ment [14]. Similarly, a user who keeps her child’s 
photograph in an open workstation area might 
choose the adverbial expressions “lovingly”, “hap- 
pily” and “playfully” rather than the obvious, i.e., 
the child’s name. The keyboard and photograph 
serve as effective cues in the respective examples. 
Still, the adjectival and adverbial expressions are 
themselves somewhat removed from objective ex- 
perience, and suitable passwords can be generated 
from them using transform techniques suggested 
earlier and developed further below. 
4. Transform Techniques 
All of the suggested approaches require transforms 
to generate passwords distanced from chosen ex- 
pressions. A multitude of transforms are available; 
however, among inexpert computer users dealing 
with untranscribed information, not many trans- 
forms will generally be deemed easy both to re- 
member and to execute. For example, lacking a 
transcription, some users cannot easily excerpt 
every third, or every fifth, character from an ex- 
Table 4 
Illustrative transforms yielding passwords from chosen expressions, with examples 
Transform Illustrative Resultant 
Exown Password 
1. transliteration photographic FOTOGRAFlK 
schizophrenic SKITSOFHENIK 
2. interweaving of characters in duke,iron DIURKOEN 
successive words (or numbers) tent pole TEPONTLE 
3. translation strangers ETRANlERI 
4. replacement of letter by cabbage 3122175 
decimal digit (modulo-10 Index 
of letter in natural order) 
5. replacement of decimal number 10/12/1492 JABADIB 
by letter (with corresponding 
position, in natural orders) 
8. shift from “home” position on zucchini XIVVJOMO 
keyboard 
7. actuetlon of keyboard “shift” 6/6/1944 A?h?!($f 
6. substitution of synonyms coffee break JAVAREST 
9. substitution of antonyms stoplight STARTDARK 
10. substitution of abbreviations relative RELHUM 
humidity 
11. use of acronyms Mothers Against MADDNOW 
Drunk Drivers, 
Nat’l. Orgn. of 
Women 
12. repetition pan PANPAN 
13. imagistic manipulation swimshaw SMIWSHOM 
( 160’ rotation of 
letters) 
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pression to form a password. On the other hand, 
most users can readily form a password by ex- 
cerpting initial characters of words or numbers 
from familiar textual material, in the manner of 
Example 2. To form passwords of creditable length 
distanced from short expressions, a few transfor- 
mations on a character-by-character basis will 
prove congenial to most users. For one such trans- 
formations, the decimal and alphabetic characters 
are each construed as forming a ring, that is, as 
occurring in their natural orders with the added 
provisos that “0” follows “9” and “A” follows 
“Z”. An alphanumeric expression can then be 
transformed by replacing each character with an 
adjacent character in its ring. Thus, the password 
“UPNBUPFT” results from substitution of suc- 
ceeding characters for those in the “tomatoes” 
item of, say, a list of favorite vegetables. Similarly, 
the password “3SNLZSNDR” results from sub- 
stitution of preceding characters for those in, say, 
the “4 tomatoes” item from a favorite recipe. 
Additional sample transforms congenial for many 
users are summarized in Table 4. For heightened 
security, transforms can be applied in sequence; 
the number of convenient transforms available 
suffices to make the approach sound. 
Earlier, we deferred discussions of both the 
choice of case for password letters and the use of 
characters other than alphanumerics. Despite the 
implications for password security, we suggest that 
user comfort govern in these matters. In particular, 
the pattern of case variation among password 
letters should be convenient and easily recalled. 
Similarly, we suggest a measured use of “printing” 
characters other than alphanumerics, when con- 
venient and as allowed by the system. For exam- 
ple, in forming passwords from expressions, 
punctuation should be carried over when con- 
genial. (In this spirit, the hyphens in the expres- 
sions of Table 3 might be carried over to the 
passwords.) Again, we commend the natural use of 
special characters such as percent and pound signs. 
Generally, the use of non-printing characters seems 
undesirable, even if allowed by the system, on the 
basis of potential difficulties with mental imagery. 
5. Mnemonics and Other Multiple-Encoding Tech- 
niques 
During the password-selection process, users 
should be aware that information available for 
password re-creation can be enhanced, in both 
scope and recallability, through conscious prepara- 
tion. Specifically, recall of relevant information 
can be expanded and heightened through recourse 
to mnemonic aids and other multiple-encoding 
techniques [15]. In particular, one advantage in 
forming passwords from selected characters of 
congenial expressions is that the expressions them- 
selves then serve as mnemonic aids. Moreover, 
direct recall of passwords can be fostered through 
judicious choices. Clearly, the choice of passwords 
comprised of words, or their transliterations - as 
in Transforms 1, 3, 8, 9 and 12 of Table 4 - 
facilitates their direct acoustical encoding. Such 
encoding involves rehearsal - a method recom- 
mended in literature on memory - that is, the 
occasional repetitive articulation of passwords 
either at sub-audible levels, or at audible levels in 
seclusion [16]. To achieve “pronounceability” of 
paswords formed through patterned selection or 
replacement of characters in expressions - as il- 
lustrated in Transforms 2 and 5 of Table 4 - care 
is required in the choices of both expression and 
transform procedure. That is, trial passwords 
formed through patterned selection or replacement 
of characters in expressions are not generally 
“pronounceable” [17]. (See Table 2.) However, 
prospects increase if latitude is allowed in the 
selection or replacement pattern, e.g., if characters 
may be treated in pairs as well as singly. (Compare 
the two examples for Transform 2, Table 4.) 
Recall can also be fostered through deliberate 
structural analysis of passwords [18]. Thus, the 
user may advantageously note such properties as 
password length and patterns in the occurrence of 
numeric characters, or of vowels and consonants 
among alphabetic characters. Recall of these 
structural properties can facilitate discovery of 
errors in trial password re-creations. In particular, 
comparative analysis of passwords in concurrent 
use can lead to encoding of information useful in 
combatting interference effects during re-creation 
attempts. Recall can often be fostered, too, through 
supplemental imagistic encoding of information 
relevant to password re-creation, e.g., through as- 
sociating the vision of a heroic goal-line stand in 
football with the expression “iron duke” in the 
example of Transformation 2, Table 4 [19]. For 
further imagistic encoding, in this example, a cast- 
iron ducal bust is imagined to sit atop the work- 
station. 
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Mnemonic aids are especially important for 
users who work with prescribed character strings. 
Included here are passwords provided by co- 
workers for joint accounts and system-generated 
strings, e.g., account identifiers or “random” pass- 
words for systems requiring extraordinary security. 
In these circumstances, users can employ the “ini- 
tial letter” technique - a proven mnemonic method 
for recalling lists [20]. Thus, associating congenial 
expressions with the prescribed strings, the user 
might devise the sentence “We four often go to the 
cinema Fridays” to help recall the prescribed pas- 
sword “w40g2TCF.” Users may seek either an 
expression that is rooted in commonplace reality, 
or one that is designedly “bizarre,” e.g, “watch 
four Orangutans grabbing two Tiny CatFish.” 
That is, since published opinion that bizarre ex- 
pressions are more easily recalled is not generally 
confirmed by experiments, and since the mental 
casts of humans may differ in this respect, users 
are perhaps best advised to cater to personal pref- 
erence [21]. Alternatively, a narrative can be con- 
trived with elements linked to successive char- 
acters of the password, e.g., “walk four blocks 
from the Office, then go two blocks toward Town 
for Clothes and Food” [22]. 
6. System-based Support for Password Methods 
To this point, we have focussed on the develop- 
ment of materials on “ user-friendly” password 
methods. But the development of such materials 
does not suffice; equally important is the “user- 
friendly” distribution of the materials. Specifically, 
guidance should be available on the system, rather 
than avoided or relegated to voluminous user 
documentation [23]. Its availability should be noted 
at initial sign-on; moreover, it should be offered 
each time a change of password is initiated. Access 
to materials addressing issues of both memorabil- 
ity and security should be facilitated through menu 
offerings. For example, descriptions and illustra- 
tions of methods for generating memorable pass- 
words should be offered to all users. Certainly, 
information on mnemonic aids should be offered 
users who must cope with prescribed passwords. 
Clearly, the system should also provide critical 
technical information, e.g., the character set, and 
range in number of characters, permitted for pass- 
words, and describe procedures for recovery in 
case a password is forgotten [24]. Users should be 
apprised automatically of the need to change pass- 
words both routinely at appropriate intervals and 
exceptionally in the face of apparent intrusion 
attempts. System imposition of standards for pass- 
words must also be considered: For example, the 
rejection of passwords less than three characters 
long should probably be the norm, rather than the 
exception. Enforced changes of passwords, and 
more general system assessment of the suitability 
of proposed passwords, e.g., rejection of dictionary 
entries, may be appropriate either now or in the 
future. 
7. Conclusion 
Experience suggests that many computer users are 
violating published strictures on password meth- 
ods. Moreover, there is no reason to believe the 
multitude of computer novices now going on 
“ user-friendly” workstations will accommodate to 
strictures reflecting, as they do, a technocentric 
focus, a lack of due regard for the user’s situation. 
We have chosen, rather, an approach based on a 
model broadly representative of cognitive processes 
involved in password selection and subsequent 
re-creation. We are thus led to propose two ap- 
proaches to password selection rooted in cognitive 
psychology. These approaches exploit principles of 
recall, reflecting particularized and generalized 
treatments of user experience, in conjunction with 
memory aids and simple formal transforms to 
produce memorable passwords distanced in form 
from ordinary experience. A third approach, based 
on the judicious use of environmental cues and 
transforms, may serve users with recall problems, 
especially in favorable environments. Intermediate 
approaches enable tradeoffs between password 
security and memorability appropriate to the con- 
text and cognitive style of the user. Admittedly, 
the approaches will lead to the use of passwords 
that are typically more vulnerable to discovery 
than those envisioned in system-oriented theory. 
However, such passwords are operationally super- 
ior to many chosen in the face of strictures reflect- 
ing a system perspective. In effect, we recommend 
an approach that accommodates, hopefully even 
appeals, to the human creative impulse. Still, the 
viability of password methods hinges on providing 
the user timely, system-based, “ user-friendly” gui- 
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dance, that is, guidance addressing memorability 
as well as security. 
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